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AREN’T I A WOMAN? DECONSTRUCTING SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND FREEING TRANSGENDER WOMEN
FROM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
Faroat Andasheva∗
That man over there says women need to be helped into carriages, and
lifted over ditches, and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody ever
helps me into carriages, or over mud-puddles, or gives me any best place!
And ain’t I a woman? Look at me! Look at my arm! I have ploughed, and
planted, and gathered into barns, and no man could head me! And ain’t I
woman? I could work as much and eat as much as a man—when I could get
it—and bear the lash as well! And ain’t I a woman? I have borne thirteen
children, and seen them most all sold off to slavery, and when I cried out
with my mother’s grief, none but Jesus heard me! And ain’t I a woman?
—Sojourner Truth 1
INTRODUCTION
In 2014, an estimated 1.5 million Americans were incarcerated in state
and federal correctional facilities.2 While the disproportionate presence of
black and Latino people in American prisons is widely known,3 transgender
individuals are another group that face stark disparities.4 Nearly 16% of all
transgender people are incarcerated at some time in their lives and the
number of black transgender individuals represents closer to half of their

∗ J.D. candidate, Florida International University College of Law, 2017; B.S., Shepherd University,
2014. I would like to thank my friends and family for their unconditional support and encouragement. I
would also like to thank Professor Michele Anglade for her support throughout the writing process.
Finally, a special thanks to the editors of the FIU LAW REVIEW for publishing my Comment and to
Gisselle Perez for carrying out my vision throughout the editing process. This Comment was written
with the utmost respect towards the transgender community and I have conducted extensive research for
proper terminology. Offensive language, if any, is not intentional and all errors that remain are my sole
responsibility.
1
PATRICIA C. MCKISSACK & FREDRICK L. MCKISSACK, SOJOURNER TRUTH: AIN’T I A WOMAN?
(1992).
2 Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1 (Dep’t of Justice, 2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14
.pdf.
3
Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/ (last
visited Mar. 29, 2016).
4
NCTE, Chapter 13: Reducing Incarceration and Ending Abuse in Persons, A BLUEPRINT FOR
EQUALITY: FEDERAL AGENDA FOR TRANSGENDER PEOPLE, http://www.transequality.org/sites/default
/files/docs/resources/NCTE_Blueprint_2015_Prisons.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
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entire population.5 While life in prison is not glamorous by any means and
is often accompanied with violence, transgender individuals face other
unique challenges and suffer from abuse from both inmates and correctional
staff at higher rates.6 For example, transgender inmates are sexually
assaulted at higher rates compared to their non-transgender counterparts.7
Research on violence in California correctional facilities revealed that 59%
of transgender inmates reported having been sexually assaulted in a
California correctional facility in contrast to 4.4% of the random sample of
inmates.8
Mirroring a diverse and changing American population, correctional
facilities find themselves facing the realities of incarcerating transgender
(“trans”) women—biological males that present or identify as women—in
male prisons. Critics often laud “Orange is the New Black,” a hit Netflix
original series for the creation of Sophia Burset, a transsexual woman
incarcerated along with other female prisoners.9 However, Sophia is a
unique case because only trans women who underwent sex-reassignment
surgery are placed into prisons that match their genitalia.10 Trans women
who choose not to go through sex-reassignment surgery, or are unable to do
so because of economic reasons, are almost always placed in male prisons.
There, an alarming number of them suffer through sexual and physical
abuse, both from other inmates and correctional staff, as well as improper
medical care and emotional distress.11
However, one thing that “Orange is the New Black” did get right is the
oft inability of prison authorities to deal with transgender inmates when it
comes to their safety.12 At one point in the show, Sophia suffered from
repeated verbal abuse from female inmates due to her transsexuality, which
later escalated into a fight.13 The fictional warden dealt with the situation
similar to how correctional authorities do in real life—Sophia was placed
into solitary confinement for her own protection and her attackers went

5

Id.
Lori Sexton, Valerie Jenness & Jennifer Macy Sumner, Where the Margins Meet: A
Demographic Assessment of Transgender Inmates in Men’s Prisons, 27:6, 835–66, JUSTICE QUARTERLY
(2009).
7
Id. at 837.
8
Id.
9
Orange is the New Black: I Wasn’t Ready (Netflix Series July 13, 2013).
10
See generally Sydney Tarzwell, Note, The Gender Lines are Marked with Razor Wire:
Addressing State Prison Policies and Practices for the Management of Transgender Prisoners, 38
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 167 (2006).
11
Id. at 169.
12
Orange is the New Black: Don’t Make Me Come Back There (Netflix Series June 11, 2015).
13
Id.
6
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unpunished.14 More often than not, trans women are placed in solitary
confinement or administrative segregation for protection from the rest of the
inmate population.15 This policy becomes more problematic because an
alarming amount of prisons automatically place trans women into
segregation without assessing their needs or an incident that would warrant
segregation for safety purposes.16 As a result, trans women spend an
indefinite amount of time, or even the entirety of their sentence, in isolation
solely due to their status as transgender.17
In the past, all lawsuits brought under federal anti-discrimination laws
were unsuccessful because the courts refused to read the word “sex” as
encompassing more than traditional notions of male and female.18 Lawsuits
brought by transgender inmates under the Equal Protection Clause, in
regards to their placement into segregation or need for medical treatment,
have been unsuccessful because jurisdictions across the country do not
consider transgender individuals to be a protected class.19 Thus, their
claims were viewed under rational basis review. Under this standard, the
courts found that placing transgender individuals into solitary confinement
was rationally related to the legitimate purposes of ensuring safety of the
prison population.20
However, the approach the courts took towards transgender
discrimination claims changed after the Supreme Court’s decision in an
employment discrimination case, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.21 There, the
Supreme Court ruled that negative comments about the plaintiff’s lack of
femininity were a motivating factor in passing her over for a promotion and
constituted sex discrimination based on gender stereotypes.22 The holding
that discrimination based on gender stereotype is sex-based discrimination
changed the way courts look at sex discrimination.23 Since then, circuit
courts throughout the country have applied the reasoning in Price
Waterhouse to cases across all areas of law. The courts found that
discrimination against transgender individuals is sex discrimination because

14

Id.
Tarzwell, supra note 10, at 180.
16
Id. at 194.
17
Id. at 171.
18
See generally Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F. 2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977); Ulane v. E.
Airlines, Inc., 742 F. 2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
19
Holloway, 566 F. 2d at 667.
20
See Lopez v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. (NRB) 10321, 2009 WL 229956 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
30, 2009); Kaeo-Tomaselli v. Butts, No. 11-00670 LEK/BMK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13280 (D. Haw.
Jan. 31, 2013).
21
See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
22
Id. at 268.
23
Id.
15
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they did not conform to sex stereotypes by expressing appearance and
mannerisms inconsistent with their biological sex.24 However, successful
transgender discrimination cases under Price Waterhouse prevailed because
the courts held that plaintiffs were discriminated against due to their
“gender non-conforming” appearance, rather than their transgender
identity.25
However, this popular judicial interpretation of Price Waterhouse
forces plaintiffs to file claims as a man or a woman whose appearance does
not match his or her biological sex and totally disregards the desires of
plaintiffs to get justice for expressing their gender identity. The federal
district court in Schroer v. Billington recognized the problematic framework
of Price Waterhouse as applied to transgender individuals and proposed an
approach of treating discrimination against transgender individuals as sex
discrimination per se.26 The court reasoned that transgender individuals
were discriminated against due to the perpetrator’s intolerance towards
people whose gender identity did not match their anatomical sex rather than
failure to conform to sex stereotypes.27 Despite Schroer’s progressive
holding, courts throughout the country continue to apply the Price
Waterhouse reasoning when dealing with transgender discrimination.28
However, application of Price Waterhouse to transgender discrimination
cases is harmful because its framework inherently misunderstands the
biological and sociological reality of transgenderism and further perpetrates
cissexist gender binary system of our society. Expanding on Schroer’s
holding that transgender discrimination is sex discrimination and
deconstructing the notion that sex is only male and female will lead to a
framework that protects trans and other non-gender conforming individuals
from sex discrimination. To be clear, the argument here is not that trans
women have a constitutional right to live among the general inmate
population. Rather, courts must recognize transgender discrimination as
discrimination against transgender people and not as against men or women
who fail to conform to stereotypes of their biological sex. Doing so will
give transgender individuals their day in court under an appropriate
framework that does not “misconstrue their existence. Expanding “sex”
discrimination beyond the dichotomous “male” and “female” would allow
courts to analyze claims challenging placement of trans women into
isolation under heightened scrutiny to determine whether discriminatory

24

See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F. 3d 566, 571 (6th Cir. 2004); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F. 3d
1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
25
Smith, 378 F. 3d at 573.
26
See Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006).
27
Id.
28
Glenn, 663 F. 3d at 1318; Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1111.
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segregation practices further an important government interest in a way that
is substantially related to that interest. In the words of Justice O’Connor,
“[t]he purpose of requiring [intermediate scrutiny] is to assure that the
validity of a [gender-based] classification is determined through reasoned
analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often
inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.”29
Part I of this Note will provide the history, science, and sociology
behind transgenderism, as well as information on the exact nature of the
struggles that trans women face in male prisons and the realities of solitary
confinement. Part I will also discuss approaches and policies of various
jurisdictions towards transgender inmates. Furthermore, it will provide the
standard of judicial review for transgender discrimination cases in the
United States prior to Price Waterhouse and offer rationale for recognizing
transgender individuals as a protected class subject to intermediate scrutiny
under the Equal Protection clause. Part II will discuss Price Waterhouse
and the way it affects transgender discrimination litigation across the
country and argue why it should not remain the dominant framework used
by courts to extend rights to transgender individuals. Furthermore, Part II
will also analyze the split that followed the decision in Schroer to determine
whether expansion of Judge Robertson’s treatment of transgender
discrimination as sex discrimination per se provides a successful framework
for Equal Protection litigation. Part III will provide recommendations for
eliminating narrow sex and gender constructs in the legal world, as well as
safe and sensible options for housing transgender inmates that do not
include protective custody or placement into the general population
opposite of their self-identity.
Ultimately, this Note concludes that Price Waterhouse inherently
misunderstands the nature of transgenderism because its logic does not
apply equally, or at all, to those who identify as transgender, and it does not
challenge the existence of the socially-imposed binary sex/gender system.
While the logic in Schroer does not remedy the issue, following Judge
Robertson’s path of recognizing the complexities of sex and gender, and
treating transgender discrimination as sex discrimination, will enable maleto-female (MTF) inmates to challenge their placement in solitary
confinement under heightened scrutiny.30

29
30

Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982).
See Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 212–13.
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BACKGROUND
Bending Gender: Understanding Transgenderism
Laymen, as well as many legal professionals, use the terms “gender”
and “sex” interchangeably. Yet, it is important to distinguish the two. The
term “sex” refers to a person’s biology, which, contrary to popular belief,
extends beyond male and female.31 “Intersex” is a general term used to
describe individuals born with sexual anatomy that is neither fully female
nor male.32 For example, a child is intersex if born with typical female
genitalia and internal testes.33 Some individuals are born with XY
chromosomes, yet retain a typical female body.34 Additionally, there are
“sex” chromosomes beyond the widely known XX and XY, such as XXY.35
Some children are born with an enlarged clitoris and a shallow or absent
vagina or a small penis and an opening in the scrotum that may resemble a
vagina.36 When faced with ambiguous genitalia, doctors, not nature, decide
the sex of the child, oftentimes followed by an early genital-normalizing
surgery.37 The child grows up with the assigned sex and gender identity,
often unaware of his or her condition.38 As a result, some intersex children
will later reject their assigned gender.39 Understanding that sex does not
exist in “black and white” is vital when considering claims of sex
discrimination because despite not being as diverse as gender, “sex” should
be read beyond male and female and grant protection to those that fall in
between.
The term “gender” refers to characteristics culturally associated with a
person’s biological sex.40
“Gender identity” refers to a person’s
“internal . . . sense of being either male or female, or something other or in
between.”41 Gender identity is an internal experience not visible to others.42

31 INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA, What is Intersex?, http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_
intersex (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
32
Id.
33
Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law’s Failure to Protect Intersex
Infants, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 63 (2006).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 63–64.
36
Id. at 63.
37
Id. at 66.
38
Id. at 65.
39
Tamar-Mattis, supra note 33, at 74–75.
40 JAMISON GREEN, Introduction to Transgender Issues, in TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A
HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 1, 2 (2012).
41
Id. at 3.
42
Id.
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In contrast, a person’s “gender expression” is readily observed by others
and consists of socially defined characteristics and behaviors associated
with masculinity or femininity.43 A person’s gender expression may or may
not be consistent with socially prescribed gender roles and is not always
reflective of a person’s gender identity.44
For most people, their gender identity is congruent with the sex
assigned at birth (i.e., a person born with a female body has a female gender
identity). However, some individuals do not experience congruency
between their gender identity and expression and their physical traits.
People who experience this have been called “transgender.”45 Persons
included under the “transgender umbrella” are those that are labeled: preoperative, post-operative, and non-operative transsexuals, cross-dressers,
intersexed individuals, androgynous men and women, and genderqueer
people.46 Other words for transgender include “gender variant,” “gender
different,” and “gender non-conforming.”47
While there are numerous identities that fall within the transgender
spectrum, transgender individuals may be divided into three categories. On
one end of the spectrum, there are “transsexuals,” individuals with gender
identity opposite to their biological sex.48 Until recently, transsexualism
was classified as a “gender identity disorder” (“GID”).49 However, the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition
(DSM-V) renamed GID to “gender dysphoria” and moved it out of the
sexual disorders category into a category of its own.50 Now, “gender
dysphoria” is a diagnosis used by mental health professionals to describe
people who experience significant distress with the sex and gender they
were assigned at birth.51 The name change and declassification of GID as a
pathological disorder helps deconstruct the binary notions of gender where
identities outside of masculine and feminine are deemed abnormal.52 In
addition, DSM-V recognizes that the distress component of gender
dysphoria results from ostracism and discrimination suffered by transgender

43

Id. at 3.
Id. at 3–4.
45
Id. at 4–5.
46
GREEN, supra note 40, at 3.
47
Id. at 4.
48
Male-to-female transsexuals (“MTF”) are biological males who identify as females. Femaleto-male transsexuals (“FTM”) are biological females who identify as males.
49
See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (4th ed. 2000).
50
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
451 (5th ed. 2013).
51
Id.
52
Id. at 814.
44
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individuals and is not an inherent part of transgender identity.53 Many, but
not all, transsexuals seek hormone therapy and sex-reassignment surgery to
align their physical characteristics with their gender identity.
In the middle of the trans people spectrum are “transgender”
individuals, whose appearance, personal characteristics, or behaviors fall
outside the traditional notions of male and female.54 The term “transgender”
attempts to encompass a broader range of gender non-conforming people
than the term “transsexual” and thus includes non-operative transsexuals,
cross-dressers, drag queens, intersex people, and genderqueer people.55
At the opposite end of the spectrum from transsexuals are “gendervariant people,” also known as gender non-conforming individuals such as
androgynous men and women.56 Those individuals still identify with their
biological sex, but are perceived to be “masculine women” and “feminine
men,” thus still suffering stigma and discrimination for failure to conform
to societal stereotypes.57
Me, Myself, and I: Overview of Solitary Confinement
Solitary confinement is a condition of “extreme isolation and
deprivation” that has been used by prison administrators since the 1600s.58
While solitary confinement is imposed on inmates for a variety of reasons,
including rehabilitation and protection, many prison administrators view the
practice as an effective way to maintain order and discipline inside their
prisons.59 The rationale behind the effectiveness of solitary confinement is
rooted in a human predisposition to seek out companionship.60 Once in
prison, inmates lose many basic privileges available to an average person.61
Because human contact is one of the very few privileges inmates retain in
prisons, prison administrators reason that inmates feel compelled to follow
prison rules and standards when faced with the risk of losing that
privilege.62 Inmates’ fear of solitary confinement is understandable, for the
devastating effect of solitary confinement on the human psyche and body is

53

Id. at 458.
See GREEN, supra note 40, at 4.
55
Id. at 3.
56
Id. at 4.
57
Id.
58
Tracy Hresko, In the Cellars of the Hollow Men: Use of Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons
and its Implications Under International Laws Against Torture, 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 4 (2006).
59
Id. at 2.
60
Id.
61
See id. at 3.
62
See id.
54
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well-documented.63 While incarceration in itself is isolating and harmful to
human social development, solitary confinement features components that
make general incarceration look like a stay in the Hamptons. Solitary
confinement cells are designed to allow minimal human contact, often
being the size of an average bathroom with solid steel doors and devoid of
personal possessions, books, and windows.64 Inmates in solitary
confinement spend an entire day alone, with an hour or two reserved for
showering or recreational activities, both still done in isolation.65 Those
inmates are also denied educational and vocational opportunities offered to
inmates in most prisons.66 They are prohibited from watching television,
listening to radio, or reading newspapers and books.67 Inmates in isolation
experience “extreme anxiety, hallucinations, violent fantasies,
hypersensitivity to external stimuli, and increased tendency to inflict selfharm.”68
With no federal laws regulating the use of solitary confinement, prison
administrators exercise a wide range of discretion in determining when and
for how long an inmate is isolated.69 The decisions and policies of
correctional authorities also enjoy much deference from the judicial branch,
which makes it extremely difficult for inmates placed in solitary
confinement to successfully challenge their confinement under
constitutional standards.70
Solitary Confinement and Transgender Women
Non-gender conforming and transgender individuals are more likely
than others to be put into protective custody or solitary confinement.71 In
some instances, MTF inmates request to be segregated. Given the
discussion above about the horrors of solitary confinement, one can imagine
how serious the circumstances must be to lead to such requests.72 The
requests usually stem from fear of being violated and belief that isolation
will protect them.

63

See id.
Hresko, supra note 58, at 3.
65
See id. at 4–5.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 7.
69
Id. at 10.
70 Hresko, supra note 58, at 10.
71 Gabriel Akers, Safety and Solidarity Across Gender Lines: Rethinking Segregation of
Transgender People in Detention, 9 DUKEMNIRIER AWARDS 343, 372.
72
Id. at 372.
64
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However, some transgender people are placed into solitary
confinement against their will, for their own alleged safety. Some prisons
have policies that dictate that victims of violent attacks must be placed in
involuntary protective custody.73 These policies, helpful at a glance, do
nothing more than punish victims of violence and deter them from reporting
instances of abuse and violence they experience. Such policies have a
disproportionate impact on transgender intimates, especially MTF
individuals in male prisons.74 Ostracism felt by transgender individuals in
daily life is intensified in male prisons due to their hyper-masculinized
environments,75 where men are denied dominance and power, traits
associated with masculinity. There, they are stripped of their identity, given
a number, and must depend on prison authorities for the provision of their
most basic needs. As a result, prisoners turn to the one thing that has been
used throughout centuries to establish dominance and exert power—sexual
violence.76 In such settings with rigid gender roles and constant need to
assert dominance, prisoners displaying “feminine” traits are more likely to
be victimized.77 However, rather than developing effective policies aimed at
assigning transgender individuals to prisons that match their gender identity
and/or appearance, many prison authorities give MTF inmates a choice to
enter into administrative segregation or force them into it automatically.78
Aside from being punished for being victims of violence, transgender
individuals are often targeted and disciplined for possessing make-up
products, female or male underwear, and clothing. On top of being
disciplined for their failure to conform to the required dress code,
transgender inmates are often targeted and written up for minor infractions
that land them in solitary confinement simply because of the prison staff’s
prejudice.79
Housing and Management of Transgender Inmates Across Various
Jurisdictions
An empirical study done by Sydney Tarzwell analyzed prison and jail
practices and policies in regards to trans inmates in forty-four states.80 Only

73

Id. at 374.
Id.
75
Id.
76
Tarzwell, supra 10, at 172.
77
Jordan Mintz, Treatment of Transgender Inmates—The Double punishment, SETON HALL L.
REV. 1 (2013).
78
Id. at 10.
79
Akers, supra note 71, at 374.
80
Tarzwell, supra note 10, at 180.
74
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seven states81 had policies aimed at assessing and managing transgender
inmates.82 However, the content of the written policies in those seven states
are lackluster when it comes to providing sensitive, inclusive, and safe
placement options for trans inmates.83 One common theme among the
written policies of the seven states is the narrowly defined group of
transgender inmates that are covered by those policies.84 The policies
largely target only inmates who are diagnosed with GID and do not take
into consideration genderqueer and non-gender conforming inmates.85
Furthermore, those policies often take away their freedom to self-identify
and have medical and prison staff determine who is covered by the policies
and where they should be placed.86 The very use of the word “freedom”
may seem ironic in a prison setting, but transgender individuals have been
forced into assigned sex and gender expectations from birth and their very
existence is an act of rebellion against the binary sex and gender system in
our society. Taking away their ability to self-identify only silences them
further.
Most of the states analyzed did not have any written policies. For
example, Arkansas does not have any written policies aimed at managing
transgender prisoners and is strictly genitalia-based.87 An individual who
starts transitioning by hormone treatment or top surgery, but still has a penis
will be placed in a male prison.88 Furthermore, due to increased awareness
of sexual violence through the Prison Rape Elimination Act, a prisoner who
appears transgender to prison staff will be automatically placed into
administrative segregation.89
Some states place MTF inmates into general population unless an
incident arises that would justify their placement into protective custody.90
This practice is toxic because rather than developing policies to assess the
needs and vulnerabilities of transgender inmates at the intake level, prison
authorities are gambling with the inmates’ safety and risking their wellbeing by waiting for them to be victimized.91
Currently, the city of Denver has developed a transgender jail policy
81
The states with written policies in regards to transgender prisoners are Alabama, Colorado,
Pennsylvania, Idaho, Minnesota, and Michigan. Id. at 198–203.
82
Id. at 195.
83
See generally id. at 195–203.
84
Id. at 198–204.
85
Id.
86
Tarzwell, supra note 10, at 203.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 204.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 193.
91
Id.
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that is effective and should be used as a national model. It allows detainees
to self-identify and indicate their housing preference.92 The policy strives to
better the relationship and understanding between the detainees and the
prison staff.93 At the intake level, transgender inmates have a choice to fill
out “a statement of preference form, including a preferred name and
preferred pronouns, regardless of legal name change or whether they’ve
undergone gender-reassignment surgery.”94 After booking, such inmates
are then placed into segregation for seventy-two hours while a “transgender
review board” recommends where to assign the inmate.95 Unlike review and
committee boards of states with written policies, the Denver board takes
into consideration “psychological factors that may contribute to either the
individual’s resiliency or vulnerability,” and allows the inmate to refuse an
anatomy check.96 Furthermore, the board is allowed to consult with a
transgender individual or an informed ally to make the best possible
decision and recommendation for housing.97 However, the required
inclusion of transgender activists and allies on the board would be
preferable to mere freedom to consult them when needed. Active
involvement of the transgender community on the board will make it less
likely that recommendations and housing assignments will be done out of
ignorance and bias.
Denver’s sensible policy respects the gender identities of trans inmates
and their privacy by allowing them to take private showers, request to be
housed with other trans inmates, and request a male or female guard to
perform strip searches.98 Furthermore, Denver jail authorities did not stop
at written policies, but incorporated sensitivity training for the jail
employees and taught them the importance of gender identity and proper
vocabulary when addressing inmates.99
While Denver jail authorities take requests of the inmates into
consideration, certain criminal activities automatically deny requests of
MTF inmates to be placed into female housing.100 For example, an MTF
inmate with male genitalia and a criminal history that includes crimes of a

92
Jennifer Brown, Denver Jail Transgender Policy a National Model, DENVER POST (June 27,
2015, 1:42 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_28395500/denver-jail-transgender-policynational-model.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Transgender and Gender-Variant Inmates Department Order 4005.1, DENVER SHERIFF DEP’T
(June 6, 2012), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/026337.pdf.
97
Id.
98
See Brown, supra note 92.
99
Id.
100
Id.
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sexual nature cannot be assigned to female housing for safety purposes.101
It is important to acknowledge that even though Denver has such a
policy in place, many MTF inmates still request to be housed in male
units.102 This can be explained by the fact that many inmates are
recidivists—coming back to a familiar prison where you are acquainted
with the hierarchy and internal rules is easier than being thrust into an
essentially unfamiliar environment of female prisons.103
Tried and False Methods
While cases featuring transgender litigants challenging housing
assignments and the use of solitary confinement are few, many of those
cases have been litigated under the Eighth Amendment but with no concrete
luck.104 As a general rule, the standard to hold prison authorities liable
under the Eighth Amendment is deliberate indifference to excessive risks to
the health or safety of prisoners.105 “Serious deprivations of basic human
needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, reasonable safety,
warmth, exercise, hygiene, and sleep, can constitute violations of the Eighth
Amendment.”106 Yet, even such serious deprivations might be found
permissible if accompanied by adequate disciplinary justifications. The fact
that the courts’ do not view solitary confinement as cruel and unusual
punishment substantially limits using the Eighth Amendment to challenge a
transgender inmate’s involuntary placement into isolation.
In Meriwether v. Faulker, a transgender woman challenged her
placement into administrative segregation, which could have lasted well
into the remaining thirty-years of her prison sentence.107 Meriwether
argued that placement into administrative segregation denied her the
benefits enjoyed by other inmates, such as adequate living space, recreation,
and educational and occupational opportunities.108 While the Seventh
Circuit did not find any merit to Meriwether’s due process claim because
lockdown restrictions do not implicate a liberty interest, the court
entertained the possibility of an Eighth Amendment violation. The Seventh
Circuit found that the district court erred in dismissing Meriwether’s claim
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as a matter of law and remanded the case to ascertain actual conditions of
Meriwether’s confinement and any feasible alternatives.109 However, the
Seventh Circuit’s analysis of Meriwether’s Eighth Amendment claim
expressed some skepticism with regard to deliberate indifference by the
prison authorities towards the inmate.110 Meriwether alleged that she
suffered several assaults at the hands of the staff and other inmates in both
general population and segregation.111 The court noted that “[p]laintiff’s
claim that the defendants have deliberately failed to protect her from sexual
assault is somewhat in conflict with her desire not to remain in
administrative segregation indefinitely.”112 It is disturbing that the Seventh
Circuit viewed Meriwether’s desire to be free from sexual assault as
conflicting with the desire to be free from solitary confinement, especially
in light of allegations that both inmates and staff were the perpetrators.
Very few courts considered Equal Protection implications underlying
the policies that place transgender inmates into solitary confinement.113 In
Tates v. Blanas, a transgender woman challenged Sacramento County Jail’s
policy of placing all transgender detainees in total separation (T-Sep)
throughout their entire jail sentence.114 Defendant prison officials argued
that all transgender detainees were placed in T-Sep solely because they
were transgender and the defendants were afraid that if the detainees were
assigned to general population or less restrictive separation, they might be
harmed and the defendants would be held liable.115 Despite initially
assuming that the policy was an appropriate means of securing the safety of
detainees, the court conducted a genuine analysis of the situation in light of
the additional evidence.116 What changed the court’s mind to make them
look more closely?
First, the court reviewed differences between T-Sep inmates and the
general population and found that T-Sep detainees are deprived of many
benefits available to other inmates.117 For example, T-Sep detainees had to
be shackled during transport, were prohibited from group worship or
religious services, and were not allowed any communication with other
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inmates.118 Furthermore, they were provided rooms less sanitary than those
available to other inmates with no means to keep them clean and had
limited access to showers, phones, and recreational rooms.119 The court also
discussed other forms of discriminatory treatment, stemming directly from
Tates’ gender identity, such as denying Tates’ access to female
undergarments, sexual assault, and verbal harassment.120
Without explicitly calling attention to it, the court conducted “an Equal
Protection analysis by comparing treatment of transgender inmates with the
treatment of similarly situated non-transgender detainees.”121 Ultimately,
the court ruled against the defendants and ordered them to create a new
classification scheme that would not discriminate against transgender
detainees.122 The court held that the defendants may not deprive
transgender detainees of benefits enjoyed by others simply because of bias
against transgender individuals.123 The court further noted in dicta that
segregation of transgender inmates is not always required and that the duty
to protect transgender detainees from harm may not be used to justify
actions not reasonably related to accomplishing that purpose.124
However, Tates’ stands alone in its decision. Other claims brought
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were
unsuccessful because they were reviewed under rational basis, as
transgender individuals are not recognized as a suspect class, entitled to
heightened review.125
Prison officials easily meet the standard of
“rationally related to a legitimate government interest” by alleging that
putting MTF inmates in the general population would pose a significant
threat to security in general, and to the MTF inmate specifically.126
As discussed above, placing transgender inmates into administrative
segregation or solitary confinement does not protect them from private
abuse at the hands of the prison staff. Furthermore, the psychological
effects of isolation, inadequate hygiene and living conditions, and the
deprivation of basic human contact and amenities available to other
prisoners hardly rationalizes a government interest that is not as legitimate
as it may seem.
118
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Transgender Discrimination Jurisprudence
Pre-Price Waterhouse Transgender Discrimination Claims
Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
courts throughout the country refused to recognize transgender
discrimination under the “sex discrimination” framework of the Equal
Protection clause, Title VII, or other similar anti-discrimination laws
because the term “sex” did not extend to cover gender discrimination.
In Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., which set the precedent for
other similar decisions across various jurisdictions, the Ninth Circuit found
that transsexuals were not a suspect class for Equal Protection purposes
because they did not make up a “discrete and insular minority,” nor did they
possess “immutable characteristics determined solely by the accident of
birth.”127 The Ninth circuit did not engage in the statutory interpretation
analysis of “sex” of Title VII, satisfied with its finding that Congress has
not shown any intent other than to limit the term “sex” to its traditional
meaning.128
The court reasoned that should the appellant claim
discrimination because of her sex, she would have a cause of action under
Title VII, but the appellant in Holloway made a voluntary choice to alter her
birth sex, an act not protected under Title VII.129
Some courts held more specifically that “sex” refers to biological or
anatomical characteristics, “whereas the term ‘gender’ refers to an
individual’s sexual identity” or socially-constructed characteristics.130
These early transgender discrimination cases demonstrated that transgender
individuals were denied protection because they were victims of “gender,”
rather than “sex” and somehow courts found it to be permissible.131
Transgender activists and allies needed to find a way for courts to consider
gender discrimination before transgender individuals could be protected by
the law as a suspect class. The solution came in the form of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
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ANALYSIS
Price Waterhouse
The Price Waterhouse plaintiff, Ann Hopkins (“Hopkins”), was a
female associate and a contender for a partnership at the firm, for which she
was not selected.132 Despite Hopkins’ qualifications, the alleged reason was
her “aggressiveness” and lack of interpersonal skills.133 However, the
Supreme Court detected undertones of sexism in the comments of her
evaluators, who described Hopkins as “macho” and stated that she
“overcompensated for being a woman.”134 Hopkins’ male evaluator
advised that she could improve her chances of partnership at the firm if she
were to take “a course at charm school,” “walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry.”135 The Court found those comments to play into the existing
gender stereotypes of how a woman should act and as part of the motive
behind passing Hopkins over for a partnership at the firm.136 If gender is
just one of the motivating factors behind a decision negatively affecting an
employee, it constitutes actionable discrimination.137 In the ruling for
Hopkins, the Court held that Title VII reaches claims of sex discrimination
based on “sex stereotyping,” a notion unheard of in the past.138
Price Waterhouse Aftereffect
In light of Price Waterhouse, circuit courts across the country applied
the gender discrimination framework set out in Price Waterhouse to grant
protection to transgender individuals. The Ninth Circuit in Schwenk v.
Hartford overturned the precedent set out in Holloway.139 Schwenk, a preoperative MTF transsexual, was assigned to a male prison where Robert
Mitchell (“Mitchell”) was employed as a guard.140 Schwenk’s alleged that
there were several instances of Mitchell subjugating her to unwanted sexual
advances and harassment, which escalated to sexual assault.141 Schwenk
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Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
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sought damages for suffering a psychological injury resulting from
Mitchell’s attempted rape under Gender Motivated Violence Act
(“GMVA”).142 Mitchell argued that even if GMVA applied to men, it did
not apply to transsexuals because transsexuality is not an element of gender
but a psychiatric illness.143 The court disagreed, finding that GMVA
parallels Title VII by both statutes prohibiting discrimination based on sex
and gender.144
The Ninth Circuit then applied the framework set out in Price
Waterhouse, which dictated that gender did not need to be the motivating
factor behind discrimination, but only a part of it.145 The court directly
relied on Price Waterhouse to establish that Mitchell’s actions were
motivated, at least partially, by Schwenk’s feminine gender expression,
since he did not begin harassing Schwenk until he discovered her
transsexuality.146
In Smith v. City of Salem, appellant Smith was employed by Salem’s
Fire Department for seven years before she was diagnosed with GID.147 In
accordance with medical protocol that required an individual with GID to
present and live full-time under their gender identity, Smith began
expressing her female identity in daily life, including her workplace.148
Faced with comments from her co-workers about her “not masculine
enough” appearance, Smith informed her supervisor about her GID
diagnosis, designed treatment, and Smith’s eventual complete transition
from male to female.149 Smith then alleged that her supervisor and other
superiors conspired to fire her based on her transsexualism.150
On review, the Sixth Circuit of Appeals reversed the district court’s
dismissal, finding that precedent set out in Holloway, Ulane, and others
“has been eviscerated by Price Waterhouse.”151 The court reasoned that
similar to an employer who discriminates against a female employee who
does not wear dresses, an employer who “discriminate[s] against men
because they do wear dresses and makeup . . . [is] also engaging in sex
discrimination . . . [which] would not occur but for the victim’s sex.”152
142

Id. at 1194.
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“[D]iscrimination against a plaintiff who is transsexual—and therefore fails
to act and/or identify with his or her gender—is no different from the
discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse, who, in
sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a woman.”153 The Sixth Circuit
opined that sex stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conformance
is impermissible regardless of the reason for such behavior.154
The framework established in Price Waterhouse and the resulting case
law does not allow transgender plaintiffs to prevail on the grounds that they
were discriminated against as transgender women or men. Rather,
transgender plaintiffs prevail as gender non-conforming men or women.
Under this framework, transgender individuals have a cause of action in
court only if they “anchor” their claim in an outdated notion that there are
only two biological sexes from which their behavior deviates.155 The courts
following the footsteps of Price Waterhouse and Salem do not treat
transgender status as a separate suspect class.156
This problematic, narrow nature of Price Waterhouse’s framework is
apparent in recent cases that refuse to recognize transgender individuals as a
protected class because their claims do not fit an expected model. In
Johnston v. University of Pittsburgh, Johnston brought an action under Title
IX alleging that the defendants discriminated against him because of his sex
and his transgender status by prohibiting him from using restrooms and
locker rooms designed for men only.157 The district court found that the
policy of segregating bathrooms by sex at birth did not violate Title IX
because trans discrimination is not sex discrimination.158 The court rejected
plaintiff’s arguments based on Smith v. City of Salem and the resulting case
law reasoning that those cases do not treat transgender status in and of itself
as a suspect classification, but only deal with sex and gender stereotyping
discrimination claims, which Johnston failed to allege.159
Similarly, in Etsitty v. Utah Authority, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals outright rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Title VII grants
transsexuals protected status.160 Curiously enough, the court recognized the
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Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F. 3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id.
155
The fact that the court in Smith v. City of Salem continued to refer to Smith by male pronouns
further showcases ignorance of some courts when it comes to understanding the biological and social
reality behind transgenderism. See generally Smith, 378 F. 3d at 566.
156
See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F. 3d 1312, 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Norsworthy v. Beard, 74 F.
Supp. 3d 1110, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
157
Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 657 (W.D.
Pa. 2015).
158
Id. at 670.
159
Id.
160
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F. 3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
154

06-FAROSHA 4.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

136

FIU Law Review

5/11/17 12:43 PM

[Vol. 12:117

scientific complexities behind sex and gender but declined to address them
on the issue at hand.161 Instead, the court allowed the plaintiff’s alternative
claim that she was a biological male who was discriminated against for
gender non-conformity, but denied relief nonetheless.162 The court
reasoned that as extensive as Price Waterhouse’s rationale might be, using
a specific restroom does not constitute a failure to conform to sex
stereotypes the way of dressing, acting, and talking does.163
The shortcomings of Price Waterhouse as applied to transgender
individuals should be obvious. Protecting Hopkins’ refusal to conform to
gender stereotypes and right to express herself at the workplace allowed
other people to exist free of punishment for failure to act like their
perceived sex. However, Hopkins’ actions did not require “reconsideration
of the biological fundamentality of binary sex categories.”164 What
Hopkins did was ask for equal treatment not hindered by archaic notions of
how a woman or man should act.165 When transgender plaintiffs bring
claims under the sex-stereotyping theory, their justice is hinged on their
ability to argue that they are no different than Hopkins—a biological
woman who identifies as a woman and has the right to express behaviors
inconsistent with her sex.166 It is indeed a great irony that transgender
people, who by their very existence invalidate the authority and validity of
socially and medically-inscribed gender and sex categories, are forced to
embrace them in order to get protection of the law.
Moreover, the Price Waterhouse framework is unlikely to be
applicable to solitary confinements in prisons. Most cases where
transgender plaintiffs prevailed dealt with discrimination in the workplace
where employers treated their transitioning workers with animosity for
failing to conform to gender stereotypes of men and women.167
Transgender inmates, on the other hand, get placed into administrative
segregation for often unfounded security purposes solely because they are
transgender.
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Schroer v. Billington: Salvation?
Plaintiff Schroer applied for a position with the Congressional
Research Service (“CRS”), for which she was highly qualified for.168 As a
biological male, Schroer was diagnosed with GID and began her transition
while she was in the hiring process.169 Upon receiving an offer with the
CRS, Schroer explained to the CRS representative that she was receiving
medical treatment for gender dysphoria, which required presenting herself
as a female in every aspect of her life. Schroer intended to do just that
Upon learning that, the
when she started working for CRS.170
representative withdrew her offer to hire Schroer, explaining that given the
circumstances, Schroer would not be a good fit at CRS.171 Schroer filed a
suit, alleging that CRS withdrew the offer either because (1) it perceived
Schroer to be a man who did not conform with gender stereotypes
associated with men or (2) it perceived Schroer to be a woman who did not
conform with gender stereotypes associated with women in our society.172
In his 2006 decision denying CRS’ motion to dismiss, Judge
Robertson recognized that protection of masculine women and effeminate
men under Price Waterhouse is “different, not in degree, but in kind” from
protection of men and women who perceive themselves as someone other
than their assigned sex at birth.173 Unlike the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse,
Schroer did not “wish to go against the gender grain, but with it.”174
“Schroer . . . [did not seek] acceptance as a man with feminine traits. She
[sought] to express her female identity, not as an effeminate male, but as a
woman.”175 Judge Robertson’s explicit recognition that Schroer was a
woman embraced the notion that transgender individuals belong to the sex
with which they identify themselves. Judge Robertson concluded that CRS’
decision was not influenced by gender stereotypes, but by intolerance for
those whose gender identity does not match their genitalia.176
In a surprising move, Judge Robertson then held that while Schroer
does not have a cause of action under Price Waterhouse, she is not
precluded from protection under Title VII as a transsexual.177 In his
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reasoning, Judge Robertson criticized one of the pre-Price Waterhouse
seminal cases on transgender discrimination, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines for
its outdated and narrow reading of the word “sex” in Title VII.178 In Ulane,
an MTF plaintiff (“Ulane”) was discharged by the airline company after
undergoing sex-reassignment surgery.179 The district court decision,
penned by Judge Grady, held that because “sex is not a cut-and-dried matter
of chromosomes,” the term “sex” in Title VII extended to “sexual
identity.”180 The term “sex” “literally and . . . scientifically” applies to
transsexuals.181 The Seventh Circuit overruled the district court’s decision,
relying on legislative history behind the passage of Title VII.182 According
to the Seventh Circuit, the lack of legislative history supporting the “sex”
amendment and its last minute addition to the bill demonstrated that
Congress never considered nor intended for the word “sex” to apply to
anything other than its ordinary meaning and does not extend to
transsexuals.183 The court rationalized that if the airline perceived Ulane as
a female and discriminated against her because she was a female, Ulane
would have a cause of action under Title VII.184 However, the airline
discriminated against Ulane because she was a transsexual individual—a
class that does not enjoy the protections of Title VII.185
Judge Robertson, noting that twenty years have passed since the
decision in Ulane, reasoned that the Supreme Court decisions subsequent to
Ulane “have applied Title VII in ways Congress could not have
contemplated.”186 One stark example would be Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc., where Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous court
that
Male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned
with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evils, and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of
our legislators by which we are governed.187
Robertson did not give much weight to legislative inaction to include
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or exclude discrimination based on sexual identity, reasoning that a fortyyear-old silence is just that—silence.188 Instead, he agreed with Judge
Grady’s approach to treat transgender discrimination as sex discrimination,
noting that such an approach is a “straightforward way to deal with the
factual complexities that underlie human sexual identity. These
complexities stem from real variations in how the different components of
biological sexuality—chromosomal, gonadal, hormonal, and neurological—
interact with each other, and in turn, with social, psychological, and legal
conceptions of gender.”189
Judge Robertson revisited his decision in the 2008 opinion and came to
the same conclusion. Judge Robertson analogized Schroer’s situation with
an employee being discharged for converting from Christianity to
Judaism.190 In that hypothetical, the employer’s bias towards “only
converts” and not Christians or Jews would still be interpreted as
discrimination because of religion.191 No courts would accept the notion
that discrimination “because of religion” would not encompass religious
converts.192 In cases of transgender discrimination, the courts continue to
focus on the label “transsexual” and ignore the statutory language itself. 193
In the three years that have passed since Judge Robertson denied CRS
the motion to dismiss, CRS has unsuccessfully argued that transsexuals are
not currently covered by Title VII because of the recent bills introduced to
the House of Representatives to ban sexual orientation and gender
discrimination in employment.194 Rather than interpreting the non-passage
of the bills as a sign that Congress was content with a narrow interpretation
of “sex,” Judge Robertson agreed with Schroer that non-passage might also
indicate that the statute requires, not an amendment, but a proper
interpretation.195
Towards a More Expansive Approach to Sex and Gender
Judge Robertson’s understanding of the distinction between gender
non-conforming men and women, transgender individuals, and his
recognition of the need to protect the latter is comforting. However, it is
unclear whether his decision called for a creation of a separate class under
188
189
190
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sex discrimination or for recognition that “sex” encompasses a population
beyond “male” and “female.” If it is the former, there is a question of
whether a separate class will even solve the problems transgender people
deal with currently. If Schroer establishes transsexuals as a third protected
class, it will challenge the binary sex/gender system. However, the third
class will protect only people like Schroer, i.e. individuals diagnosed with
GID, intending to undergo sex reassignment surgery. Such classification
will exclude many others who also fall under the “transgender umbrella”
and experience discrimination across all areas of our society, from
workplace to prisons. Pre-operative transsexuals, transgenders, crossdressers, genderqueers, etc., are the ones who challenge the cissexist
notions of sex and gender the most because they do not undergo medical
procedures in order to present themselves as a man or a woman and are
often more visible than “passing” post-op transsexuals. Those people will
still remain victimized by the justice system and society.
There has been a push for creating a “gender identity” or “gender
expression” class under sex discrimination in order to extend protection to
not just “passing” post-operative transsexuals, but the rest of the persons
under the “trans umbrella.” However, creating a “gender identity” class will
essentially create a spectrum where every other identity falls someplace
between the normative man and woman. Like a “transsexual” category, a
“gender fluid” category will continue perpetuating the binary sex/gender
notions and “othering” individuals who are not female or male.
It is more likely that Judge Robertson called for interpreting “sex”
beyond male and female since he acknowledged that treating transgender
discrimination as sex discrimination “was a straightforward way to deal
with the factual complexities that underlie human sexual identity.”196 To
avoid othering transgender and non-gender conforming individuals, while
simultaneously challenging the binary sex system, a solution should consist
of trans inclusivity to the level where trans individuals fit perfectly within
the understanding of sex and gender; not occupy a small, capricious class
where their existence is divided between two sides. Expanding the
definition of “sex” in sex discrimination claims will include everyone who
is being discriminated against based on their gender non-conforming
appearance or identity. The only way to achieve that is to do away with the
sex/gender distinction and recognize that sex is not a rigid, biological
process that results only in males and females.
While society has come a long way to recognize the difference
between gender and sex, the two are not as unrelated as they may seem.197
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“The biology of sex is ambiguous. Anything one says . . . about the biology
of sex . . . is already mediated by specific models that have gender
constructs built into them.”198
[O]ur conception of sex is based on a lived biology which
is constituted of our historical and cultural ideas.”
Anthropological studies have showed us that the cultural
processes which create different identities for men and
women are different from society to society. Gender
identities are thus not similar in every cultural system. But
gender is influenced by sex and sex is influenced by
gender.199
It may be argued that gender is more rigid than sex.200 Transgender
individuals have a firm understanding of their gender identity and who they
wish to be; the only problem lies in their biological body that can be
surgically and hormonally altered to match their identity.201 One might
argue that despite undergoing sex-reassignment surgery and hormone
treatments, transgender individuals are still “genetically male.” However,
reliance on chromosomes, hormones, and internal and external sex
characteristics further undermines the notion that sex is binary and rigid.202
Where would the law and science place a male with XXY chromosomes
who appears biologically male, but whose genetic map contains two female
chromosomes? Where would science place a non-operative transwoman,
who has been on estrogen hormone treatment for years? Her genitals match
a biological male but her hormones, which are just as much a part of her
biological make-up as her genitalia, do not.
Furthermore, gender is a product of brain function and the brain is just
as biological and tangible as external and internal sex organs. This begs the
question—where and when does a person cease to be a member of one sex
and become a member of the other? Courts across the country have yet to
agree on a unified answer to this question. The attempt to answer this
question is in the following section.

198
Kari Helene Partapuoli, Woman/Man as Cross Cultural Categories: The Sex/Gender
Distinction With Reference To The So-called Third Sex, http://www.partapuoli.com/Texts/Gender_
third_sex.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2016).
199
See id.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 197, at 110.
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Is One Born a Woman or Becomes One?
The following analysis of case law differs from that in Part II because,
rather than addressing whether transgender discrimination is sex
discrimination, the cases below attempt to determine what makes a person
“man” or “woman” in the eyes of the law.
Until recently, courts around the country refused to recognize even
post-operative transsexuals as men or women for the purposes of opposite
sex marriage. In In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, an Ohio court
considered whether a post-operative MTF was permitted to marry a male.203
The court declined the marriage application, reasoning that, despite sexreassignment surgery and successfully presenting as a woman, the applicant
at birth possessed only male characteristics and there was no evidence that
the applicant’s chromosomes were anything but male.204 The Supreme
Court in Kansas used similar reasoning to void a marriage involving postoperative male-to-female transsexual.205 The court reasoned that
[t]he words “sex,” “male,” and “female” in everyday
understanding do not encompass transsexuals. The plain,
ordinary meaning of “persons of the opposite sex”
contemplates a biological man and a biological woman and
not persons who are experiencing gender dysphoria. A
male-to-female post-operative transsexual does not fit the
definition of a female. The male organs have been
removed, but the ability to “produce ova and bear
offspring” does not and never did exist. There is no womb,
cervix, or ovaries, nor is there any change in his
chromosomes. As the Littleton court noted, the transsexual
still “inhabits . . . a male body in all aspects other than what
the physicians have supplied. J’Noel does not fit the
common meaning of female. [citations omitted].206
Similarly, in Kantaras v. Kantaras, the court held that a marriage
between a “biological” woman and a post-operative female-to-male
transsexual was void ab initio.207 The court, agreeing with the courts in
Kansas and Ohio, reasoned that the common meaning of “male” and
“female” in statutes governing marriage referred to immutable traits
determined at birth.208 While acknowledging that advances in medical
203
204
205
206
207
208

In re Ladrach, 513 N.E. 2d 828 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1987).
Id. at 840.
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W. 3d 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
Id. at 228.
Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 158.
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science might warrant a change in the common meaning of “male” and
“female”, the court reserved the resolution of the issue to the legislature as a
matter of public policy.209
The courts’ refusal to see even post-operative transgender individuals
as legally male or female for the purposes of opposite-sex marriage created
an ironic loophole in the law. Their statutory interpretation of “man” and
“woman” warrants a finding that the original sex at birth is the only
determinative factor in the context of marriage. However, such logic also
dictates that an individual born a woman, but who later transitioned into a
man could technically marry another man despite the ban on same-sex
marriage.210
In contrast, a court in New Jersey recognized the validity of the
marriage involving a male-to-female transsexual.211 The court reasoned that
if an individual who underwent sex-reassignment surgery can function
sexually as a female or male, there is “no legal barrier, cognizable social
taboo, or reason grounded in public policy to prevent that person’s
identification at least for purposes of marriage to the sex finally
indicated.”212
The disagreement between the courts in determining what makes
someone a “man” or “woman” in the eyes of the law can be found in areas
outside of marriage and public policy. A district court in D.C. recognized
that a plaintiff, who underwent sex-reassignment surgery and became
legally female, had a right not to be held in temporary custody with
males.213 In Shaw v. District of Columbia, the defendants, police officers,
claiming qualified immunity argued that the plaintiff’s Due Process right
not to be held in temporary custody with males has not been clearly
established in law.214 The court disagreed, emphasizing the significance of
the plaintiff’s legal status as female.215 In explaining its reasoning, the court
distinguished Shaw from a case in Arizona, where the plaintiff did not have
a clearly established constitutional right to be housed in a women’s

209

Id. at 160.
The legalization of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015),
warrants a question whether courts that previously refused to consider MTF transgender people as
women for purposes of opposite-sex marriage will reverse their stance. Courts’ reluctance to recognize
transgender people as legal husbands or wives was understandable in the context of prohibition of samesex marriage but misguided. While sexual orientation and sexual identity are intimately intervened, they
are distinct concepts. Declaring post-operative transgender individuals as legal wives or husbands would
not equal to allowing same-sex marriage take place.
211
M.T. v. J.T., 355 A. 2d 204 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
212
Id. at 88.
213
Shaw v. District of Columbia, 944 F. Supp. 2d 43, 59 (D.D.C. 2013).
214
Id. at 57.
215
Id.
210
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detention facility because she was not legally female.216 There, the plaintiff
also identified as a transgender woman, had undergone surgical alterations
to her body to appear more feminine, was taking hormones, but had not yet
undergone sex-reassignment surgery.217 The Arizona court held that the
plaintiff had not identified any legal authority holding that a transgender
woman with intact “male” genitalia has a constitutional right to be housed
in an immigration detention facility for females.218
Upon examination of these cases, society’s obsession with genitalia
and the notion that it dictates a person’s sex is apparent. The courts may
disagree whether sex-reassignment surgery makes someone a man or a
woman, but they do agree that external genitalia, whether “real” or
achieved through surgery, is determinative of a person’s status as a man or
a woman. Thus, an individual’s right to self-identify is ignored and
completely depends on whether the court recognizes only the genitals the
individual was born with.
Courts that take into consideration only the birth sex and genetic
structure of an individual place too much importance on the authenticity of
chromosomes.219 It is impossible to know whether one is born with female
or male chromosomes without testing to confirm their chromosomal
authenticity.220 For most people, checking up on their chromosome
configuration is hardly at the top of their list during annual check-ups, so it
is likely that there are more individuals with ambiguous chromosomes than
current statistics show.221
Judith Butler’s suggestion that “bodies . . . only live within the
productive constraints of certain highly gendered regulatory schemas . . .
becomes more apparent in light of the process that takes place at
childbirth.”222 Whenever an infant is born with ambiguous genitalia or a
“micro-penis,” the gender and societal norms, not genetic make-up,
determine the sex of an infant.223 Infants born with ambiguous genitalia are
first subjected to genetic testing to determine their chromosome
configuration.224 If the test results reveal an XX configuration, surgery is

216
Id. (citing to Guzman-Martinez v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. CV 11-02390-PHX-NVW, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97356 (D. Ariz. July 13, 2012)).
217
Guzman-Martinez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97356, at *5.
218
Id. at *25–*26.
219
See Tamar-Mattis, supra note 33, at 63–64.
220
Myra J. Hird, Gender’s Nature: Intersexuality, Transsexualism, and The ‘Sex’/‘Gender’
Binary, 1 FEMINIST THEORY 347, 353 (2000).
221
Id.
222
FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 197, at 75.
223
Hird, supra note 220, at 353.
224
Id.

06-FAROSHA 4.24.2017.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Aren’t I A Woman?

5/11/17 12:43 PM

145

performed to shape the infant’s genitalia into a vagina.225 If there is a XY
configuration, doctors conduct more testing to see if genital tissue is
responsive to androgen treatment, which aims to enlarge the genitalia so it
could resemble an “actual” penis.226 If the treatment fails, the ambiguous
genitals are transformed into a vagina and an infant with XY chromosomes
is raised as a female, often unaware of the procedures that took place.227
Surgeons aren’t very good at creating the big, strong penis
they require men to have. If making a boy is hard, making a
girl, the medical literature implies, is easy. Females don’t
need anything built; they just need excess maleness
subtracted. As one surgeon well known in this field
quipped, “you can make a hole but you can’t build a
pole.”228
This shows not only that reliance on chromosomes can be misleading,
but also how the actual sex of the infant is determined. The size of a
prospective penis is used to decide the sex of an infant, not genetic makeup.229 What constitutes an “appropriately sized penis” is not dictated by
biology, but gender and societal expectations.230 Furthermore, gender traits
and stereotypes are not similar in every cultural system. In some cultures,
femininity is associated with power rather than submission and nurture. The
reading of nature is done through sociocultural lenses—just as gender is
sexed into masculine and feminine categories, sex is gendered into male and
female categories.
Discrimination against crossdressing men and transvestites is
technically gender stereotype discrimination that is explicitly prohibited by
Price Waterhouse, but crossdressers also fall under the transgender
umbrella because they challenge the gender norm, go against the social
grain, and cross gender boundaries, if only temporarily. Is there a sincere
need for a separate class if another alternative is to simply educate the
masses that sex and gender is not black and white and the reading of the
word “sex” should not be narrowed down to male and female?
The courts’ lack of recognition of people who do not appear
traditionally male or female, of people who do not identify as either, or
people who self-identify as trans can be directly attributed to the sex-gender
distinction. The application of Price Waterhouse to transgender
discrimination cases is a prime example of this harmful distinction. Instead
225
226
227
228
229
230

See id. at 361.
Id.
Id. at 364.
FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 197, at 59.
See id. at 59–60; see also Hird, supra note 220, at 351.
Hird, supra note 220, at 351.
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of allowing plaintiffs to self-identify and file claims as trans women being
discriminated against because they are trans women, the Price Waterhouse
framework only recognizes discrimination of a person who is biologically
“X” but acts and behaves as “Y.”231 Schroer, on the other hand, embraced
the notion that transgender individuals have a right to self-identify with the
sex they want and rejected the practice of placing trans plaintiffs into the
categories of the sex assigned to them at birth.232 Instead of perceiving
Schroer as a male who underwent sex-reassignment because he identifies as
a woman, Judge Robertson saw a woman who was being punished for
taking steps to finally become comfortable with herself. Robertson’s
acceptance of Schroer’s claim that she is a woman subverted the approach
of other courts viewing transwomen as women with male bodies.
Does Law Imitate Life or Does Life Imitate Law?
Interpretation of statutory language equips the judiciary with a
powerful ability to define categories and decide which category a person
belongs to. This ability was used to shape race relations in the United States
since the days of slavery and continues to do so now.233 Modern battles
over the interpretation of “sex” are reminiscent of forgotten and infamous
precedents, such as deciding what makes someone “white” and “non-white”
to deny people of color freedom or citizenship.234
It has been long established that race is not rooted in biological reality,
but is sociopolitical in nature.235 The notion that there is only one race, the
human race, is cliché, but accurate. Despite variances in hair and skin
colors and the shape of one’s eyes, differences between individuals of the
same race are often greater than the differences between the “average”
individuals of different races.236 However, social constructions of racial
categories have long been used as a means of achieving various social
purposes.237
In the United States, the categorization of people based on their race
was created to enhance and solidify the socioeconomic institution of

231
See Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 657
(W.D. Pa. 2015).
232
See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
233
Frank H. Wu, From Black to White and Back Again, White By Law: The Legal Construction
of Whiteness, 3 ASIAN L.J. 185 (1996).
234
Id. at 189.
235
Luther Wright, Jr., Who’s Black, Who’s White, and Who Cares: Reconceptualizing the
United States’s Definition of Race and Racial Classifications, 48 VAND. L. REV. 513, 518 (1995).
236
Id. at 523.
237
Id. at 524.
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slavery.238 The categories did not emerge from a vacuum, but were rather
carefully created through law and pseudo “racial” science.239 The creation
was indirect because early laws defined race in terms of blood or ancestry.
Because both are not readily apparent to society, blood ancestry had to be
inferred from physical appearance.240 This proved to be ineffective after an
increase in biracial people, who could have passed as “white,” so the laws
became more stringent.241 The end result was the famous “one-drop rule”
that mandated placing everyone who has one drop of black blood into the
black race category, regardless of their appearance.242
In In re Ah Yup, a circuit court held that petitioner, a Chinese man, was
not considered white, and was thus not eligible for naturalization.243 In his
holding, the judge relied on the ordinary meaning of the word “white,”
dictated by the “well settled meaning in common popular speech . . . [as
understood] everywhere” in the United States.244 Similarly, a Japanese man
in Ozawa was denied naturalization despite arguing that he was “white”
within the meaning of the word because his skin color was actually white.245
The Court, reverting to its “one-drop” rhetoric, held that skin color alone is
not determinative of race.246 The Court rejected a literal statutory
interpretation approach, focusing instead on the intent of the legislature and
came to the conclusion that, by the words “white person,” the legislators
only meant to include people of Caucasian decent.247 Ozawa, despite his
fair complexion, fell under the Mongolian racial category.248
The cases above represent only a small sample of case law that played
a major role in crafting racial categories. Nonetheless, they demonstrate
that courts play an important role in creating and enforcing social categories
through interpretation of statutory language. Courts in the past assumed
that they knew what it meant to be “white,” just like the courts now assume
that they know what it means to be a man or a woman. Some courts, wary
of defining “sex” broadly, reserved the right to do so for the legislature249
and some relied on Congress’ inaction as indication that “sex” was intended

238

Id. at 520–21.
Id. at 545.
240
Id. at 523–24.
241
Wright, supra note 235, at 524.
242
Id.
243
Carrie Lynn H. Okizaki, “What are You?”: Hapa-Girl and Multiracial Identity, 71 U. COLO.
L. REV. 463, 478 (2000).
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F. 3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007).
239
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to be read narrowly.250 However, as Schroer correctly pointed out,
“Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several
equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the
inference that the existing legislation already incorporated the offered
change.”251
In addition, the argument that Congress never considered nor intended
that the word “sex” apply to anything other than its ordinary meaning
because it was a last-minute addition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is
moot.252 It may be argued that clinging to the ordinary meaning of “sex” is
narrow-minded, since Congress did not contemplate what should be
considered under “sex.”253 Moreover, as noted by Justice Scalia in Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Services, “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils. . . .”254 Amending
statutes that prohibit sex discrimination to include transgender
discrimination is likely to turn out problematic in the future for reasons
discussed throughout Part II. Sex and gender do not exist in binaries; they
extend beyond male and female, masculine and feminine. There are
countless identities that do not fit into neat “transgender woman” and
“transgender man” categories. “Othering” people who do not identify as a
man or a woman will reinforce the binary male/female sex hierarchy.
CONCLUSION
When an inmate is segregated, and placed into isolation, administrative
or otherwise, solely because they are transgender, intersex, or gender
nonconforming, the Fourteenth Amendment is violated. The courts must
acknowledge transgender discrimination as sex discrimination and apply
heightened scrutiny to determine whether such segregation furthers an
important government interest in a way that is substantially related to that
interest.
The current transgender discrimination framework, under Price
Waterhouse, will not work in the long term and does not work for trans
inmates in solitary confinement. The Price Waterhouse framework forces
plaintiffs to file claims as non-gender conforming men or women, which
essentially denies the very existence of trans people and genderqueer folk.
Furthermore, the Price Waterhouse framework provides relief to
250

Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F. 2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (quoting Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S.
633 (1990)).
252
Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086.
253
Id.
254
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
251
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transgender plaintiffs that do not conform to gender stereotypes and exhibit
behavior in conflict of their biological sex. Trans inmates, on the other
hand, are placed into administrative segregation because of their status as
transgender, often under misleading or unwarranted concern for their safety.
To avoid othering transgender and non-gender conforming individuals, a
solution should consist of trans inclusivity to the level where trans
individuals fit perfectly within the understanding of sex and gender, and not
occupy a small category where their existence is divided between two sides.
Understanding that “sex” extends beyond “male” and “female” and
recognizing that transgender discrimination is sex discrimination will do
just that.
To be clear, the assumption that trans women are vulnerable to attacks
is not incorrect. There are instances of trans women requesting to be placed
into protective custody to protect themselves from harm and abuse.
However, such requests, due to the psychological damage of isolation,
abuse by the prison staff, and poor conditions of solitary confinement cells,
are comparable to a trapped animal forced to chew off its own leg to escape
and are hardly ideal. We must also provide trans inmates with an
environment where they are not forced to subject themselves to complete
isolation to survive. The prison system in the United States needs to
develop more effective policies regarding housing transgender inmates, not
leaving them with limited options of either remaining in the often-hostile
general population or spending their incarceration period in isolation. The
desire to be free of harm and the desire to not be isolated from the
population should not be mutually exclusive.
The experience of gender is internal; it cannot be accurately
determined by genitals or appearance. A prisoner’s self-identity should be
the driving force behind housing assignment decisions. The housing
policies instituted in the city of Denver have been largely successful, with
the Department of Corrections recommending other jails and prisons across
the United States to follow their model. The most significant detail about
the housing policies in Denver jails is the detainee’s agency and the right to
self-identify. Detainees in Denver jails are able to take private showers,
request to be housed with other trans inmates, and request a male or female
guard to perform strip searches.255 Furthermore, the incorporation of
sensitivity training for the jail employees and education on the importance
of gender identity and proper nouns256 may contribute to reducing staff
violence against transgender inmates.
However, Denver’s policy of automatically barring trans women with

255
256

See Brown, supra note 92.
Id.
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records of sexual assault from being assigned to female housing units
creates another pocket of prison population in need of proper assignment.
An ideal solution would be to create a separate housing unit for transgender,
intersex, or non-gender conforming prisoners who are somehow
disqualified from being assigned into units matching their gender identity.
Such housing must be carefully crafted to avoid further marginalization of
transgender individuals. Separate housing for non-gender conforming
individuals will also provide protection to those who do not identify as
transgender, but are at risk of being sexually assaulted or abused.
The change will not happen overnight; it will not happen for many
years to come. The implementation of this framework must begin at the
fundamental institutions of our society, such as schools and households. It
must begin with our children and the deconstruction of a notion that there is
a huge difference between men and women. This framework does not call
for abolishment of sex categories, nor does it invalidate the reality and
experiences of men and women. What this framework does is challenge the
binary sex hierarchy and provides a legal and societal space for those
existing outside of it.

